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Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution 
Introduction 
Ethe moment that justice Louis D. Brandeis announced the Su- 
preme Court's decision in the spring of _~938,_Erie Ra~Co. Y. Tompkins has 
fascinated members of the legal profession.1 Reaching far beyond Harry Tomp- 
kins's personal injury claim, Brandeis's decision addressed fundamental con- 
stitutional issues involving the locus and scope of lawmaking authority in the 
American legal system. Overruling Swift Y. Tyson, a ninety-six-year-old decision 
that had expanded the power of the national courts to create a "general" federal 
common law independent of the common law of the states, it sought to limit that 
judicial pow.er and rebalance the lawmaking structure of American government. 
As massive historical changes altered the social and political significance 
of Swift, however, they did the same to Brandeis's creation. To view Erie through 
the historian's eyes-to consider its complex social origins, its purposeful human 
crafting, and its shifting but nevertheless patterned reinterpretation over the 
years-is to explore both the sweep of American experience in the twentieth 
century and the practices of its legal and political elites in molding the nation's 
rules, concepts, principles, and ideologies oflaw. The changing national experi- 
ence and the evolving ideas and legal practices are examined here, as much as or 
more than Brandeis and his decision. This book is a work of history, not of law.2 
In Part 1, Chapters 1 through 3 provide an overview of the period from 
1877 to 1937, highlighting a range of developments that helped create the dis- 
tinct politico-constitutional age that shaped Brandeis's views and ultimately 
gave birth to Erie. This period was marked by a fundamental premise concern- 
ing the role of the federal courts and the relationship between the legislative and 
judicial branches. Legal commentators of all stripes came to see the judiciary- 
especially the federal judiciary-as the branch of government that would most 
consistently protect private property and interstate corporate enterprise. They 
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viewed state and federal legislatures-and sometimes even state courts-as the 
branches most likely to threaten those interests. In the decades surrounding the 
turn of the century the Supreme Court expanded the reach of federal judicial 
power to increase the ability of the federal courts to review government regu- 
latory efforts, while Progressives" came to believe that significant social and 
economic reform could take place only if that power were limited and state and 
national legislative powers were expanded. These developments, this book ar- 
gues, underlay Brandeis's constitutional theory. 
Part 2 focuses on Brandeis-his judicial practice, his evolving consti- 
tutional philosophy, and his opinion in Erie for a bare five-justice majority. 
Chapters 4 through 7 argue that Brandeis played the preeminent role both in 
forging a majority and in shaping the Court's final opinion, and they provide in- 
sight into the meaning of Brandeis's decision by relating it to his values, politics, 
personal motivations, and overall constitutional jurisprudence. These chapters 
conclude that Brandeis was animated by broad personal and social purposes and 
that he sought to use his opinion to institutionalize the goals and values of early- 
twentieth-century Progressivism. 
Part 3 considers the fate of Brandeis's decision and his Progressive ideals 
in a new and different postwar world. Chapters 8 through IO argue that tumul- 
tuous historical changes ripped his opinion from its cultural moorings and pro- 
pelled it into a drastically different world where judges and legal scholars viewed 
it with new eyes. These chapters explore the subsequent interpretations that 
fundamentally reshaped Brandeis's opinion as later generations struggled to 
control the scope and function of the federal judicial power in a new politico- 
constitutional age. 
Chapter rr, the final chapter, sketches developments of the past quarter 
century. Writing "recent" history (where the conscious and unconscious prompt- 
ings of contemporary concerns are powerful) is difficult, especially when the 
subject is law. Erie remains deeply embedded in continuing professional dis- 
putes, and its history bears an immediate normative significance that other his- 
torical subjects often lack. The scholarly commentary, moreover, has reached 
staggering proportions. To treat that literature with justice would require a sepa- 
rate book, and to identify its most significant and enduring contributions would 
require a perspective that is as yet unavailable. Thus, the final chapter brings the 
story of Brandeis and Erie to century's end by noting its highlights. 
"The word Progressive is capitalized to refer to the ideas, values, and assumptions that characterized many of the re- 
form movements of the early twentieth century, particularly their widely shared if somewhat varied commitments 
to science, expertise, efficiency, popular education, democratic government, the rights of labor, the limitation of 
corporate power, and the use of government to ameliorate the harsh consequences of industrialization. The term 
does not refer to the formal Progressive party that was organized around Theodore Roosevelt. 
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Through its three parts, the book explores the complex relationship be- 
tween changing American politics and evolving ideas concerning the practice of 
constitutional government and the role of the federal judiciary. On one level, it 
examines the origins and intended significance of the Court's landmark decision 
in Erie. Recognizing the complexities and ambiguities of the issues involved, 
it nevertheless concludes that the case has been widely misunderstood, in large 
part because judges and legal scholars have too often divorced it from its full 
and vital historical context. It was neither a simple articulation of the positivism 
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., nor the inevitable result of a "philosophi- 
cal revolution" in the Court's understanding of "law." The book suggests that 
commentators have persistently overemphasized Erie's "philosophical" content 
while minimizing or ignoring other more important elements. Similarly, the de- 
cision was not designed primarily to protect "federalism" or special enclaves of 
state law. Rather, its more vital concern lay in broader ideas about judicial law- 
making and separation of powers. Nor, again, was Erie simply a product of the 
"constitutional revolution" that the Supreme Court carried out after spring 1937. 
It was closely related to that pivotal period, but it bore an oblique and problem- 
atic relationship to the jurisprudence of the "Roosevelt Court." 
On a second level, the book is a study of Brandeis and his work as a con- 
stitutional judge. It explores the tensions that arose from his political Progressiv- 
ism, his role as a justice, his strategic position on a historically specific Court, and 
his developing and purposeful constitutional jurisprudence. The book posits that 
Erie reflected Brandeis's deepest concerns and illuminated central elements of 
his judicial practice and philosophy. More particularly, it argues that his purpose 
in Erie was not only to destroy the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, reject its osten- 
sibly outmoded jurisprudence, and terminate its generally pro-corporate con- 
sequences. Instead, his broader goal .was twofold. First, Brandeis sought to re- 
structure the American judicial system to increase both its operational efficiency 
and its capacity to provide practical justice. Erie was an integral part of his long- 
term effort to adapt the court system of the states and the nation to the demands 
of a new interstate society. Second, Brandeis sought to constrain a pervasive if 
amorphou~µicial practice by which the Supreme Court had, for more than half 
a century, used common.law techniques to expand its lawmaking powers and, 
all too often, to serve anti-Progressive purposes. Brandeis wrote Erie not only 
to terminate the "federal general common law" but also to cabin more generally 
the lawmaking powers of the national courts in a variety of cognate areas . . { 
On a third level, the book uses Erie as a case study to explore the ways in 
which historical processes shape and reshape fundamental ideas about legal doc- 
trines, the role of the judiciary, and the nature of constitutional government. The 
world of early twentieth-century Progressivism inspired both Brandeis and his 
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decision in Erie, but that world was expiring as Brandeis drafted and delivered 
his opinion. His reasoning and purposes could hardly have maintained their full 
intended meaning in a radically new age. The book shows how succeeding gen- 
erations of judges and scholars worked, sometimes consciously and sometimes 
not, to remake both Brandeis's image as a constitutional judge and his opinion in 
Erie. The decision was not the "founding document of modern American judicial 
federalism," as one distinguished scholar has termed it, nor was it the case that 
"shaped the agenda and analysis of the legal process school" that grew to promi- 
nence in the postwar decades, as another equally distinguished commentator has 
declared.3 True, it was subsequently tailored to those purposes, but Brandeis's 
intent was quite different. Indeed, Erie was quite different from the polestar ver- 
sion that Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr.-the decision's most brilliant and influ- 
ential scholarly advocate-imagined and confidently proclaimed to the world. 
Brandeis's decision, the book argues further, was also quite different from 
the famous precedent that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly applied 
during the succeeding half century. It was not the case Justice Felix Frankfurter 
explained so carefully in Guaranty Trust Co. Y. York, nor the decision Chief Justice 
Earl Warren implemented inWanna v. P~nor the opinion Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., invoked so forcefuI!y in Cannon v. University of Chicago.4 Because 
of the Court's immense power and prestige-and because its pronouncements 
constitute "authoritative" statements of "the law" - its interpretations over the 
years tend to blur, obscure, and then replace broad and complex historical 
understandings with formalized doctrines. That elaborate formal practice of re- 
defining and remaking legal rules is an essential part of the legal process. As a 
matter of historical understanding, however, it is dysfunctional. Equally impor- 
tant, as a matter oflegal doctrine, the practice is also a powerful force for covert 
change. In both its origins and subsequent interpretation, the history of Erie v. 
Tompkins illuminates the way individual perspectives and social pressures have 
driven the law's contingent evolution. In this critical sense, the book explores 
Erie, an unusual case in so many respects, as representative. , 
As the book exploresthe complex dynamics of legal change, it suggests 
a number of conclusions. It points, for example, to the historicity of that most 
exalted, rigorous, and frustrating law school course (labeled differently from 
school to school), "Federal Courts." Inspired by the confrontation between pro- 
gressivism, professionalism, and the conservative politics of the 1920s, this now 
standard course and respected field of study was largely inspired by Brandeis 
and molded by Frankfurter in the process of grappling with the legal parame- 
ters of pressing social and political conflicts. Born of political commitment and 
ideological conviction, the idea of "Federal Courts" as a special field of schol- 
arly study spread in the 1930s and 1940s and then grew to maturity following 
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World War II. Historical changes between the Great Depression and the cold 
war, however, altered the field of study, fragmented its assumptions, and con- 
fused its purposes. Thus, the field changed substantially in the decades following 
World War II, with few students recognizing the exact nature of those changes. 
Indeed, only recently have "Federal Courts" scholars even begun to consider 
the extent to which their subject is the confected product of distinctive histori- 
cal developments. 
The book shows, too, that aspects of the grand historical synthesis that 
Frankfurter designed over the course of his life as scholar and judge were highly 
misleading. In particular, it highlights significant issues that divided Brandeis 
and Frankfurter after the mid-rojos and emphasizes Frankfurter's changing 
views, his role in remolding Erie's significance for his own purposes, and his 
subsequent efforts to recast Brandeis's judicial image to provide support in his 
constitutional battles with Justice Hugo L. Black and the early Warren Court. 
It also explores the differences that developed between Frankfurter and Hart, 
his brilliant student and colleague, over the nature of the federal judicial system 
and the constitutional role of the national courts. During the period of Hart's 
greatest intellectual achievements, from World War II into the 1960s, he was 
far more a judicial activist and nationalist (and had a far more ambiguous rela- 
tionship to both Frankfurter and the Warren Court) than has been commonly 
acknowledged. 
More generally, the book points to the critical role "branch affinities" 
played in the ideological commitments of diverse political partisans to the dif- 
ferent branches of government. It suggests that such foundational ideas as fed- 
eralism, separation of powers, and the respective constitutional roles of the vari- 
ous branches of government are rooted largely in expectations concerning the 
practical consequences that varying allocations of institutional authority would 
likely cause. The legal meaning and political significance of those foundational 
ideas shift, fragment, and realign over time as controlling social and political 
expectations are transformed. 
Finally, in the process of probing for a "historical Erie, "the book raises 
deep, if familiar, doubts about the concept of a knowable and authoritative 
"original intent." 5 To provide insight into Brandeis's purposes and strategies, 
the book addresses a single decision, on a clearly defined issue, well known and 
widely discussed both prior to and contemporaneously with the decision, and 
made by a group composed of a mere five individuals who acted only sixty years 
ago and who bequeathed to us a relatively extensive and informative documen- 
tary record. Indeed, arguing that Brandeis was Erie's dominant author, the book 
focuses largely on a single individual who left behind an extraordinarily rich 
and voluminous collection of relevant materials, including especially valuable 
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and revealing private letters and working judicial papers. Despite these quite ex- 
ceptional advantages, however, the inquiry relies unavoidably on the historian's 
inference and speculation. Thus, answers to even relatively simple, recent, and 
specific questions - even when based on unusually abundant and illuminating 
sources-remain tentative and incomplete. 
The analysis, moreover, highlights problems and ambiguities that plague 
efforts to use "original intent" as an authoritative legal norm. It argues, for ex- 
ample, that Brandeis's reasoning in Erie was flawed because he had to navigate 
around the views of the four justices who joined him to create his bare majority. 
At least two, and possibly all four, of them apparently misunderstood, doubted, 
or disagreed with the constitutional language Brandeis chose. The opinion was 
also flawed because Brandeis made conscious tactical decisions to obscure and 
avoid as well as to illuminate and effectuate.6 Thus, the Court's opinion was, in 
places, opaque and misleading by design. The analysis, in short, supports those 
who argue that the idea of a normative "original intent" makes historical inquiry 
the oracle of answers that it often cannot provide. Equally important, the analy- 
sis also suggests that a fully "authentic" original intent-even if discoverable 
and applicable to the questions that later generations pose-may not be persua- 
sive, serviceable, or even recognizable to those later generations who ask new 
questions on the basis of their new and different perceptions and assumptions. 
Seriously qualifying and limiting (although hardly rejecting) ideas of 
original intent, the book suggests that historical evolution creates limitations and 
imperatives that infuse with new meaning the words of authoritative documents. 
The test of the wisdom and validity of those new meanings is only partially a 
historical question. We can learn far more by recognizing and understanding 
that continuous process of change and reinterpretation than by pretending that 
we can discover and apply an objective and legally directive "original intent" 
free from the limitations, pressures, and needs of our time. 
Although the book questions both the utility and validity of most pur- 
portedly normative and directive ideas of original intent, it shows that histori- 
cal analysis carries distinctive virtues. Historical analysis can clarify the ways 
in which changing values, problems, and circumstances drove the evolution of 
constitutional assumptions and practices; it can aid us in understanding how past 
generations strove to make complex socio-legal processes work; and it can illu- 
minate the ways in which the various institutions and rules oflaw affected the di- 
verse elements of American society. Historical analysis need not boast complete 
truth or promise authoritative answers to specific legal questions in order to help 
us-and future generations-learn how we might continue to shape those pro- 
cesses to sustain and enhance a decent, ordered, and relatively democratic life.7 
Accordingly, the book hazards a broader historical, constitutional, and 
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normative conclusion. It suggests that Brandeis and his opinion in Erie, although 
flawed, were admirable. This conclusion is based on a complex judgment that in 
his opinion, as in his judicial career, Brandeis successfully combined four para- 
mount virtues: he articulated sound and fundamental constitutional principles; 
he served the cause of popular, representative government; he adapted legal rules 
effectively to serve desirable institutional goals; and he improved the ability of 
the legal system to provide practical justice to the weak and disadvantaged. 
